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The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in Village of
Hoffman Estates v. The Ftipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc.: Revision or Misapplication?
Aware of the serious national problem of drug abuse' and the
"nexus between the abuse of controlled substances and the glorification
of devices which facilitate such abuse,"' 2 local communities 3 in recent
years have enacted statutes or ordinances that prohibit or otherwise
regulate the sale, manufacture, or possession of drug paraphernalia.
4
These enactments have resulted in an explosion of litigation and con-
flicting judicial opinions concerning the constitutionality of drug para-
phernalia laws.
5
In Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Riovside, Hoffman Estates,
1. In 1981, the United States Congress found that drug abuse was rapidly increasing
in the United States, afflicting urban, suburban and rural areas of the nation; that drug
abuse substantially contributed to crime, and that the adverse impact of drug abuse inflicted
increasing pain and hardship on individual, families, and communities and undermined our
institutions. Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L., No. 92-
255, § 101, 86 Stat. 66, 66-67 (1972) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §1101 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)).
2. Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356, 1361 (10th Cir. 1981).
3. The Justice Department determined that the campaign against drug paraphernalia
should be fought mainly by state and local communities. Drug Paraphernalia: Hearing
Be/ore the House Select Comnz on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33
(1979) (statement of Irving B. Nathan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Divi-
sion, U.S. Justice Dept.). The Drug Enforcement Administration in 1979 drafted the Model
Drug Paraphernalia Act to aid local communities in enacting constitutionally sound drug
paraphernalia ordinances. MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT (1979), reprintedin 7 DRUG
ENFORCEMENT 29 (1980).
4. See Note,Anti-Drug Paraphernalia Laws. oidfor Vagueness?, 61 B.U.L. REV. 453
(1981).
5. Most courts have held the laws to be unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness
or overbreadth. See, e.g., Record Head Corp. v. Sanchen, 682 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1982);
Magnani v. City of Ames, 493 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D. Iowa 1980); Music Stop, Inc. v. City of
Ferndale, 488 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F. Supp.
990 (D.N.J. 1980); Record Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1979);
Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F. Supp. 1297 (D.N.J. 1979); Smith v. Roark, No. 80-2110
(S.P. W.Va. May 13, 1980); Indiana Chapter, N.O.R.M.L., Inc. v. Sendak, No. TH 75-142-C
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 1980). Other cases have held such laws constitutional. See, e.g., Tobacco
Accessories & Novelty Craftsmen Merchants Ass'n v. Treen, 681 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1982);
New England Accessories Trade Ass'n v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1982); Florida
Businessmen for Free Enter. v: City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213 (11 th Cir. 1982); Mid-
Atlantic Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Maryland, 500 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1980); Delaware
Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Gebstein, 497 F. Supp. 289 (D. Del. 1980); World Imports, Inc. v.
Woodbridge Township, 493 F. Supp. 428 (D.N.J. 1980).
[1273]
Inc. ,6 the United States Supreme Court passed upon the validity of one
such drug paraphernalia law and in so doing may have substantially
limited a civil plaintiff's ability to challenge a law on vagueness
grounds. Deeming the ordinance not void for vagueness, the Court
held that if an enactment does not reach constitutionally protected con-
duct, greater vagueness may be tolerated if the statute imposes only
civil penalties, is a business regulation, or contains a scienter
requirement.
7
This Comment explores the Court's vagueness analysis in FlIpside.
The Comment first outlines the provisions of the Village of Hoffman
Estates drug paraphernalia ordinance and describes the difficulties that
the retailer The Flipside experienced in determining what items were
covered by the ordinance. After explaining the process used by the
Court in assessing the ordinance's vagueness, the Comment analyzes
the Court's treatment of the vagueness issue. Attention is given to the
statute's "designed and marketed for use" terminology, explaining its
operation and evaluating its constitutionality in the context of the mod-
em standard for vagueness as enunciated in Grayned v. Rockford." The
Comment criticizes the Fpside Court's application of the vagueness
standard and warns that it may represent a weakening of constitutional
protection from impermissibly vague legislation.
The Development of the Case
The Factual Background
In June, 1976, The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (The Flipside)
opened a retail store in a shopping mall in the Village of Hoffman Es-
tates, Illinois (Village). The Flipside sold a wide variety of merchan-
dise including records, tapes, concert tickets, tobacco, novelty devices,
jewelry, and magazines.9 On February 20, 1978, the Village enacted
Ordinance No. 969-1978, entitled "An Ordinance . . . Providing for
Regulation of Items Designed or Marketed for Use with Illegal Canna-
bis or Drugs."' 0 The ordinance defined drug paraphernalia as any
"item, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing which is designed or
6. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
7. See infra notes 29-31 & accompanying text.
8. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). See infra note 27.
9. More specifically, the district court found the novelty and tobacco related items
included mirrors, clamps, chain ornanments, cigarette holders, scales, pipes, water pipes,
and tobacco snuff. The Flipside also sold cigarette rolling papers in a variety of colors, and
literature that included National Lampoon, A Child's Garden of Grass, Rolling Stone, Mari-
juana Grower's Guide, and High Times. 485 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. 111. 1980).
10. The full text of the ordinance provides:
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"WHEREAS, certain items designed or marketed for use with illegal drugs
are being retailed within the Village of Hoffman Estates, Cook County, Illinois,
and
WHEREAS, it is recognized that such items are legal retail items and that
their sale cannot be banned, and
WHEREAS, there is evidence that these items are designed or marketed for
use with illegal cannabis or drugs and it is in the best interests of the health, safety
and welfare of the citizens of the Village of Hoffman Estates to regulate within the
Village the sale of items designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or
drugs.
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the President and Board of
Trustees of the Village of Hoffman Estates, Cook County, Illinois as follows:
Section I: That the Hoffman Estates Municipal Code be amended by adding
thereto an additional Section, Section 8-7-16, which additional section shall read as
follows:
Sec. 8-7-16-ITEMS DESIGNED OR MARKETED FOR USE WITH ILLE-
GAL CANNABIS OR DRUGS
A. License Required:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons as principal, clerk, agent or
servant to sell any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing which is
designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs, as defined by
Illinois Revised Statutes, without obtaining a license therefor. Such licenses
shall be in addition to any or all other licenses held by applicant.
B. Application:
Application to sell any item, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or things which is
designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs shall, in addition
to requirements of Article 8-1, be accompanied by affidavits by applicant and
each and every employee authorized to sell such items that such person has
never been convicted of a drug-related offense.
C. Minors:
It shall be unlawful to sell or give items as described in Section 8-7-16A in any
form to any male or female child under eighteen years of age.
D. Records:
Every licensee must keep a record of every time, effect, paraphernalia, acces-
sory or thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or
drugs which is sold and this record shall be open to the inspection of any
police officer at any time during the hours of business. Such record shall con-
tain the name and address of the purchaser, the name and quantity of the
product, the date and time of the sale, and licensee or agent of the licensee's
signature, such records shall be retained for not less than two (2) years.
E. Regulations:
The applicant shall comply with all applicable regulations of the Department
of Health Services and the Police Department.
Section 2. That the Hoffman Estates Municipal Code be amended by adding
to Sec. 8-2-1 Fees: Merchants (Products) the additional language as follows:
Items designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs $150.00.
Section 3: Penalty. Any person violating any provision of this ordinance shall
be fined not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than five hundred dollars
($500.00) for the first offense and succeeding offenses during the same calendar
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marketedfor use with illegal cannabis or drugs. . . ."I I Persons who
sold such items were subjected to various regulatory requirements, in-
cluding a requirement to maintain a log of purchasers' names and ad-
dresses. The ordinance also banned the sale of such items to minors.
Violations of the ordinance were punishable by fines of up to $500.00
per item, with each day that a violation continued deemed a separate
offense. 12
A series of guidelines that were intended to clarify the "designed
or marketed for use" standard 13 accompanied the ordinance. 14 Ac-
cording to the guidelines, certain innocuous items otherwise expressly
year, and each day that such violation shall continue shall be deemed a separate
and distinct offense.
Section 4: That the Village Clerk be and is hereby authorized to publish this
ordinance in pamphlet form.
Section 5. That this ordinance shall be in full force and effect May 1, 1978,
after its passage, approval and publication according to law."
HOFFMAN ESTATES, ILL., ORDINANCES No. 969-1978 (1978) (quoted in The Flipside, Hoff-
man Estates, Inc., v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp. at 403-04) [hereinafter cited as
ORDINANCE].
11. ORDINANCE, supra note 10, § I(D) (emphasis added).
12. Additionally, the ordinance required sellers of paraphernalia to pay a $150.00 li-
cense fee to sell such items in addition to a separate general merchant fee for the privilege of
selling other legal retail items, and have employees sign and file affidavits averring that the
employee had never been convicted of a drug-related offense. 485 F. Supp. at 404.
13. The guidelines provide:
LICENSE GUIDELINES FOR ITEMS, EFFECT. PARAPHERNALIA, ACCESSORY OR
THING WHICH Is DESIGNED OR MARKETED FOR USE WITH ILLEGAL CANNABIS
OR DRUGS
Paper - white paper or tobacco oriented paper not necessarily designed for use
with illegal cannabis or drugs may be displayed. Other paper of colorful design,
names oriented for use with illegal cannabis or drugs and displayed are covered.
Roach Clips - designed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs and therefore
covered.
Pipes - if displayed away from the proximity of nonwhite paper or tobacco
oriented paper, and not displayed within proximity of roach clips, or literature
encouraging illegal use of cannabis or illegal drugs are not covered (sic]; otherwise,
covered.
Parapernalia - if displayed with roach clips or literature encouraging illegal
use of cannabis or illegal drugs it is covered.
License Guidelines to ORDINANCE, supra note 10 [hereinafter cited as Guidelines].
14. Lower courts, assessing the vaguenes of similar drug paraphernalia ordinances,
have referred to accompanying guidelines as a valuable means of interpreting the ordi-
nances. See, e.g., Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551, 560 (8th Cir. 1981). Although not
expressly adopted by a legislative body, guidelines and regulations accompanying a statute
may be considered when scrutinizing the enactment for vagueness. See United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), wherein the Court
used regulations purporting to construe a statute in rejecting a claim of vagueness. Id. at
575. Thus, the Supreme Court's consideration of such guidelines in assessing an ordinance's
vagueness was accepted practice, and the Court did rely on the guidelines in its decision.
See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 500-01
(1982).
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excluded from the ordinance were considered drug paraphernalia if
they were located in spatial proximity to certain enumerated items.
5
No factors other than proximity were considered.
16
Soon after enactment of the ordinance, The Flipside consulted
with the Village Attorney to determine what items in the store, if any,
would be covered by the ordinance. The Village Attorney indicated
that the ordinance applied to all colored cigarette rolling papers. When
The Flipside asked whether the ordinance applied to any other items in
the store, the Village Attorney merely gave The Flipside the
guidelines.
17
After The Flipside was unable to secure advice in determining
what merchandise was covered,' 8 The Flipside removed anything that
might possibly be affected rather than risk the imposition of a $500.00-
per-day fine for each item sold in violation of the ordinance. 19 The
Flipside then filed in federal district court for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction on the grounds that the ordinance
was unconstitutionally vague, violated the plaintiffs first amendment
rights, and denied plaintiff equal protection of the law.2
0
The Treatment of the Case Below
The district court denied The Flipside's motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. Trial for a permanent
injunction and declaratory judgment was subsequently held without a
jury or additional evidence and on stipulated testimony. The trial
court awarded judgment to the Village, holding that the ordinance was
not unconstitutionally vague, did not violate first amendment rights,
was not overbroad, and did not deny defendants equal protection of
15. Enumerated items were those items deemed by the guidelines themselves to consti-
tute drug paraphernalia. These included rolling papers of colorful design or with names
oriented for use with illegal cannabis or drugs, roach clips, and literature encouraging the
illegal use of cannabis or drugs. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman
Estates, 485 F. Supp. at 404.
16. The court of appeals in Flipside found that "it appears that displaying almost any
item in the proximity of, for example, 'literature encouraging illegal use of ... drugs,'"
would trigger enforcement of the ordinance. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village
of Hoffman Estates, 639 F.2d 373, 382 (1981). A careful reading of the ordinance reveals no
reference to intent. See supra note 10. The Supreme Court, however, read an intent element
into the ordinance. See infra notes 73-96 & accompanying text.
17. Joint Appendix to Record at 44, Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoff-
man Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
18. Id. at 64, 71.
19. In all, 79 articles, all legal retail items, were taken off the floor. About half the
items were various types of pipes; the remaining items included such objects as surgical
clamps, alligator clips, key chains, jewelry, and cigarette rolling papers. Id. at 31-32.
20. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp.




The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that
the ordinance was so vague as to violate the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.
The court held that the ordinance failed to make clear what items were
included in the statutory prohibitions and what items were not, and
allowed a further danger of arbitrary enforcement in inferring use or
possession of drugs from the purchase or possession of certain legal
retail items.22  The Supreme Court, on appeal, noted probable
jurisdiction.
23
The Constitutional Attack on the Village of Hoffman Estates Ordinance
The Flipside raised two constitutional issues in its attack on the
Village ordinance: 1) whether the ordinance violated due process stan-
dards by failing to give adequate notice of what items were regulated,
encouraging discriminatory enforcement by failing to provide objective
standards to judicial agents; and 2) whether the ordinance on its face
was overbroad in that it affected both proscribed and protected con-
duct, thereby chilling the exercise of first amendment rights. Although
the Supreme Court addressed both of these issues, the Court's ultimate
disposition was founded primarily upon the vagueness attack.
24
The Supreme Court's Decision
The Court in Flipside was faced with the task of determining
whether the standard "designed or marketed for use" was so unclear in
meaning as to fail to identify the type of merchandise the village de-
sired to regulate. The Court undertook an evaluation of the vagueness
21. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp. 400
(1980).
22. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 639 F.2d 373
(7th Cir. 1981).
23. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 452 U.S. 904
(1981).
24. In addressing the overbreadth challenge, the Court held, first, that the scope of the
ordinance did not embrace noncommercial speech. The Court reasoned that while the ordi-
nance regulated the sale of items displayed "with" or "within proximity" of literature that
encouraged use of illegal cannabis or drugs, it did not prohibit or regulate the sale of litera-
ture itself. As for drug-related designs or names on cigarette papers that caused such items
to be subjected to regulation, the Court found the Village did not thereby restrict speech as
such, but merely regulated the commercial marketing of items whose labels revealed that
they could be used for an illicit purpose.
Second, regarding The Flipside's commercial speech interests, the Court found that the
ordinance did not appreciably intrude on The Flipside's first amendment interests with the
obvious and intended exception of commercial speech encouraging drug use. Such speech is
speech proposing illegal conduct and is thus subject to government regulation. Village of
Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982).
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doctrine and the ordinance to determine if the language of the ordi-
nance, which did not reach constitutionally protected conduct,2 5 was
"impermissibly vague in all of its applications. ' 26 The process encom-
passed an analysis of the applicability of the vagueness standard enun-
ciated in Grayned v. City of Rockford,2 7 a linguistic analysis of the
phrase "designed or marketed for use," and scrutiny of The Flipside's
claim that the standards for enforcement were insufficient. The Court
began with an analysis of the Grayned vagueness standard, declaring
that the standard should not be mechanically applied, and that "[tihe
degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates as well as the rela-
tive importance of fair notice and fair enforcement. . depend in part
on the nature of the enactment. '2 8 The Court enumerated three situa-
25. Id
26. Id at 497. In a challenge to the facial vagueness of a law that implicates no consti-
tutionally protected conduct, a court should not sustain the challenge unless the law is vague
in all its applications. A statute that clearly applies to some conduct of the plaintiff cannot
be challenged as vague when applied to the conduct of others. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
756 (1974). Should confusion over whether the ordinance applies to certain items ripen into
an actual prosecution, however, The Flipside in a post-enforcement proceeding could then
attempt to show that the ordinance was being unconstitutionally employed in the particular
application.
27. 408 U.S. 104 (1977). An ordinance is void-for-vagueness when it "fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute" and allows discriminatory and arbitrary arrests. See United States v. Harris, 347
U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). The basis for this rule of
law is that "[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the [government] commands
or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). For an in-depth analysis of
the United States Supreme Court's treatment of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see Note,
The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). While
it is recognized that "[i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties," Rose v.
Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975), a statute written in terms so ambiguous that persons "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application" is
unconstitutionally vague. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). The
modem-day standards for vagueness have been enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972):
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohib-
ited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to
be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoe and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers
of arbitrary and discriminatory application.
Id. at 108-09 (footnotes omitted).
28. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 498.
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals had acknowledged this concept. The
vagueness standard as enunciated in Grayned simply declared, "It is a basic principle of due
process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). No lesser qualification was made for enactments that do not abut
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tions in which an enactment may be subject to a less strict vagueness
analysis: 1) when economic interests are regulated, 29 2) when civil
rather than criminal penalties are imposed,30 and 3) when scienter is
required. 31 By declaring the ordinance to be one regulating business
behavior, imposing only "nominal" civil penalties, and containing a
scienter requirement, 32 the Court cleared the way for applying a less
constitutionally protected conduct. Indeed, it could be argued that Grayned set out a "bot-
tom-line" standard; that is, when an enactment reaches constitutionally protected conduct,
an even stricter standard is required. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963),
on which the Grayned Court commented that "where First Amendment interests are af-
fected, a precise statute 'evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct be...
proscribed,' assures us that the legislature has focused on the First Amendment interests and
determined that other governmental policies compel regulation." Grayned v. Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 109 n.5 (1972) (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963)).
29. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 498.
The Court partially based this determination on dictum in Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), to the effect that the subject matter of economic regulation is often
more narrow, and on the grounds that businesses that are faced with economic pressure to
plan behavior carefully, "can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of ac-
tion," either through their own inquiry or through an administrative review process. Id. at
162.
30. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 498-
99. For cases in which the Supreme Court has held that an ordinance's imposition of civil
rather than criminal penalties is immaterial to vagueness analysis, see A. B. Small Co. v.
American Sugar Ref. Co. 267 U.S. 233 (1925); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (discussed
infra notes 52-60 & accompanying text).
31. At least one commentator has noted that there are different kinds of scienter, only
one of which is useful as a tool for clarifying vagueness. See, Note, supra note 27:
"Scienter" has frequently been found a component of the offense created by the
statute charged with indefiniteness, and on each occasion the statute has been sus-
tained, in part on the notion that the requirement of guilty knowledge clarified it.
Yet it is evident that, unless the Court has been fooling itself in these cases, the
"scienter" meant must be some other kind of scienter than that traditionally known
to the common law-the knowing performance of an act with intent to bring about
that thing, whatever it is, which the statute proscribes, knowledge of the fact that it
is so proscribed being immaterial. Such scienter would clarify nothing; a clarifi-
catory "scienter" must envisage not only a knowing what is done but a knowing
that what is done is unlawful or, at least, so "wrong" that it is probably unlawful.
One difficulty here is that it is uncertain whether the courts which subsequently
enforce the statutes which the Court sustains will employ the same brand of "scien-
ter" as the Court; if not, and if "scienter" was essential to the Court's holding, then
of course the statute which is constitutional is not being administered and the stat-
ute which is being administered is not constitutional. In any event, "scienter" has
become a recognized element of the lore of vagueness, and represents at its best, a
tool to be designedly used in the service of other ends; at its worst, a port of entry
for the ethical predilections of the then sitting Court.
Id at 87 & n.98 (citations omitted). See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 375, 395 & n. 13
(1979).
32. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 499.
While the Village conceded that the ordinance was "quasi-criminal" by virtue of its prohibi-
tory and stigmatizing effect, and could therefore require a strict vagueness test, the Court
[Vol. 34
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restrictive vagueness test to the Village ordinance.
After conceding that the words "item, effect, paraphernalia, acces-
sory or thing" did little to identify those items the village sought to
regulate,33 the Court conducted a linguistic analysis of the standards
"designed for use" and "marketed for use" to determine if they satis-
fied the "fair warning" prong of the Grayned vagueness test. After not-
ing the court of appeals' objections to the term "designed for use,"' 34 the
Court held that the term could only refer to the design of the manufac-
turer, and that the phrase therefore referred to the physical characteris-
tics "of items deemedper se fashioned for use with drugs," e.g., colored
rolling papers.35 Items primarily used for non-drug purposes, such as
tobacco pipes, are not "designed for use" with illegal cannabis or drugs,
and hence could not be regulated under this standard.36 The Court
concluded that because "the standard encompass[ed] at least an item
that is principally used with illegal drugs by virtue of its objective fea-
tures, i.e., features designed by the manufacturer," 37 the standard was
not vague in all its applications,38 and thus was not impermissibly
vague.
39
Turning to the alternative "marketed for use" standard, the Court
found this standard "transparently clear."40 Holding that the standard
referred to a retailer's intentional display and marketing of merchan-
stated that even under the stricter standard, the ordinance would pass constitutional muster
because "the ordinance is sufficiently clear as applied to Flipside." Id at 500.
33. The district court did not analyze the "designed or marketed for use" standard,
analyzing instead the words "item, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing." Such analysis
led to circular and equally vague definitions as illustrated by the district court's determina-
tion that the word "paraphernalia" was becoming an accepted term to those who would
purchase paraphernalia for use with illegal cannabis or drugs, while at the same time noting
Webster's definition of paraphernalia to be "articles of equipment." The Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp. at 406-07. Such definitions left the
uninformed no better off than before, and it may be for this reason that the high Court
agreed with the court of appeals that such a regulation of "paraphernalia" would not satisfy
the fair warning prong of the Grayned test.
34. These objections centered on whether the items had to be inherently suited for drug
use only; whether the intent of the manufacturer, a third party, was to be the center of any
inquiry of "design"; and whether the intent of the retailer could obviate the design of a
manufacturer. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 639 F.2d
at 381-82.
35. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 501
n.19.
36. Id. at 501.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. See supra note 26.
39. That the ordinance and guidelines "[did] contain ambiguities," did not trouble the
Court. The Court stated that whether further guidelines would clarify the ambiguous scope
of the "designed for use" standard was of "no concern in this facial challenge." Hoffman
Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 502.
40. Id.
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dise,41 the Court articulated a test for determining whether such items
were "marketed for use," thereby subjecting a store to the ordinance's
licensing requirements; a store must obtain a license "if it deliberately
displays its wares in a manner that appeals to or encourages illegal
drug use."'42 Additionally, the Court found the standard contained a
scienter requirement.43 Noting that The Flipside displayed High Times
magazine in proximity to pipes and colored rolling papers, that the
store's co-owner admitted that The Flipside sold roach clips, and that
The Flipside posted a sign in its shop saying "You must be 18 or older
to purchase any head supplies," the Court concluded that The Flipside
had sufficient warning that its marketing activities would require a li-
cense.44 Under either the "designed for use" or "marketed for use"
standards, then, at least some of the items sold by The Flipside were
covered, and The Flipside therefore failed to meet its burden of show-
ing the ordinance to be impermissibly vague in all of its applications.
45
Finally, in reviewing The Flipside's claim that the Village ordi-
nance did not furnish sufficient standards for enforcement, 46 the Court
declared that "[i]n reviewing a business regulation for facial vagueness
. ..the principal inquiry is whether the law affords fair warning of
what is proscribed. '47 Thus, by determining that the ordinance pro-
vided some degree of fair warning, the Court could conclude that "[tihe
language of the ordinance is sufficiently clear that the speculative dan-
ger of arbitrary enforcement does not render the ordinance void for
vagueness."'48 While acknowledging the confusion in the testimony of
41. Id.
42. id.
43. The Court reasoned that "a retailer could scarcely 'market' items 'for' a particular
use without intending that use." Id.
44. Id. at 502-03.
45. See supra note 26.
46. A common fear of the courts dealing with drug paraphernalia ordinances has been
that the ordinances would be used to harass individuals with differing political views and
lifestyles. See, e.g., The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 639
F.2d at 384; Housworth v. Glisson, 485 F. Supp. 29, 38 (N.D. Ga. 1978), affd, 614 F.2d 1295
(5th Cir. 1980).
47. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 503.
The Court gave two rationales: first, such an emphasis was necessary because the complaint
constituted a pre-enforcement challenge to a law; and second, no evidence was or could have
been introduced to support the claim that the ordinance would be enforced in an arbitrary
manner. Id. See also supra note 26.
48. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 503.
The Court alluded to Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-71 (1977). and
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1977), suggesting that the danger of arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement is directly tied to the use of vague terms. While such a
theory may have previously held merit when any finding of vagueness would be sufficient to
strike down an enactment as unconstitutional (or, when the enactment reaches constitution-
ally protected conduct), the question arises as to whether the theory is logically supportable
when an enactment must be vague in all its applications to be void for vagueness. As the
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the Village President and the police chief as to whether certain items
were covered by the ordinance, the Court was not prepared to declare
that the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement jeopardized the
entire ordinance.4 9 Further, the Court assumed that the Village would
take further steps to minimize the dangers of arbitrary enforcement,
including relying primarily on the "marketed for use" standard and
adopting additional administrative procedures to aid in clarification of
the ordinance.50
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Fl4pside Decision
The Flipside Court did not discuss certain critical factors that
could have led to a stricter vagueness analysis. First, under the Court's
construction of the Village ordinance, an enactment may be subject to a
less strict vagueness analysis when the enactment imposes civil as op-
posed to criminal penalties.5' In so declaring, the Court failed to ac-
count for a line of cases holding that the Constitution requires an
ordinance to give adequate warning of prohibited conduct, regardless
of whether the ordinance imposes civil penalties or criminal sanctions.
In A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co. ,52 the Supreme
Court decided a contract case in which the defendant referred to a
criminal statute that the Supreme Court had previously found to be
unconstitutionally vague. The Court stated:
[D]efendant attempts to distinguish those cases because they were
criminal prosecutions. But that is not an adequate distinction ....
It was not the criminal penalty that was held invalid, but the exaction
of obedience to a rule or standard which was so vague and indefinite
as really to be no rule or standard at all. Any other means of exac-
tion, such as declaring the transaction unlawful or stripping a partici-
pant of his rights under it, was equally within the [vagueness]
level of vagueness tolerated rises the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
may rise too. Cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-171 (1977).
49. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 503.
The testimony of the Village Police Chief illustrates that the proximity standard would initi-
ate enforcement without regard to other factors or intent. Counsel asked the police chief:
"Now if I were to tell you that Exhibit No. 6 was sold in a Flipside Records without any
signs but merely there where literature was displayed, where the literature that contained
The Child's Garden of Marijuana or whatever other literature they displayed, would it then
be a regulated item?" The chief responded: "It would be if an officer could tell me that it
can be used or is presumed to be used for illegal cannabis and drugs." Joint Appendix at
Record at 67, Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489 (1982).
50. The Court did not proceed to identify what these additional administrative proce-
dures might be.
51. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 498-
99. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959); Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
52. 267 U.S. 233 (1925).
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principle.
53
In Baggell v. Bullit, 54 the Court reaffirmed the requirement that
all enactments conform to a standard of certainty. The Baggett case
arose from a Washington state law that forced state employees to sign
an oath of loyalty to the United States as a condition of employment.
The Court cited A. B. Small and held that "[tihe State may not require
one to choose between subscribing to an unduly vague and broad oath,
thereby incurring the likelihood of prosecution (for perjury), and con-
scientiously refusing to take the oath with the consequent loss of em-
ployment, and perhaps profession. .... -55
More recently, the courts have looked at the severity of the penalty
to determine whether a civil enactment should be held to the same
standard of specificity as a criminal law. In Jordan v. De George,56 the
Supreme Court held that "[d]espite the fact that this is not a criminal
statute, we shall . . . test this statute under the established criteria of
the 'void for vageness doctrine' " because of the "grave nature" of the
penalty involved.57 In Jacobs v. Board of School Commissioners,5 8 the
Seventh Circuit noted "the substantial danger of inadequate warnings"
and of "arbitrary enforcement," and held that even though a criminal
statute was not involved "the penalties for violation are sufficiently
grievous to mandate careful scrutiny for vagueness." 59
TheA.B. Small-Jordan line of cases thus suggests that civil as well
as criminal statutes must avoid vagueness, at least if grave civil penal-
ties are involved. The Village ordinance therefore should not have
been held to a lower vagueness standard merely because it did not im-
pose criminal penalties. The ordinance could have subjected The Flip-
side to a fine of $39,500 for each day The Flipside was in violation of
the ordinance.60 Owing to the severity of the penalty, the ordinance
should meet a specificity standard equal to that required of a criminal
53. Id. at 239.
54. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
55. Id. at 374. Most recently, the principle was applied in Houseworth v. Glisson, 485
F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1978), af'd, 614 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1980), a case with facts very
similar to those of the Flipside case. Under a county ordinance, the county finance director
attempted to revoke the business licenses of certain retailers whose merchandise included
"materials that may be used for the consumption of illegal drugs." Id. at 31. The Supreme
Court's reasoning in A. B. Small and Baggett impelled the district court in Houseworth to
reach the conclusion that, whether or not the law governed business activities or imposed
criminal sanctions, "the principles behind the vagueness doctrine remain the same and the
language in Grayned is as important to the present case as any other." Id. at 37.
56. 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
57. Id. at 231.
58. 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973).
59. Id. at 605.
60. Joint Appendix to Record at 12, 29, Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc.. 455 U.S. 489 (1982). The Flipside's owners removed 79 items from
the store's shelves that the owner's thought might come under the ordinance. If The Flipside
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statute.6
1
The Court also pointed out that economic regulations are often
held to a less demanding vagueness standard because there is often re-
course to clarifying administrative processes, 62 and because businesses
that face economic pressure to carefully plan their behavior can be ex-
pected to consult relevant legislation before they act.
63
The Flipside, however, was not able to clarify the meaning of the
regulation, either by resort to an administrative process or by its own
inquiry. No interpretive rules had been adopted by the Village to clar-
ify the ordinance,64 and when The Flipside made its own inquiry of the
Village Attorney about which items in the store the ordinance applied
to, the Village Attorney could not state what merchandise was cov-
ered.65 Nor did The Flipside face economic pressures to investigate
beforehand; the items it sold that were alleged to be drug paraphernalia
were only a sideline to its primary inventory of records, tapes, and nu-
merous other items.66 Because neither of the conditions justifying ap-
plication of a less strict vagueness test were present in The Flipside's
situation, the less demanding standard may have been unwarranted.
Finally, in evaluating the "designed for use" and "marketed for
use" standards, the Supreme Court determined that each contained a
scienter requirement. The Court has long recognized that a scienter
requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, both in respect to the ade-
incurred the maximum fine at $500 per item, with each day deemed a new offense, the
penalty would total $39,500 per day.
61. Moreover, the Village conceded that the ordinance was "quasi-criminal" because
of the stigmatizing effects of the purchaser's log. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 499 n.16. Because the effects of the ordinance were stig-
matizing and the penalty was severe, a strict vagueness test may have been warranted.
62. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 49 (1966) (New York
statute regulating the sale of liquor in state not vague because of access to State Liquor
Authority for clarification of rule).
63. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1963)
(provision of Robinson-Patman Act, making it a crime to sell goods "below cost" with the
intent of destroying competition held not vague as to corporation in the business of purchas-
ing and distributing milk).
64. Joint Appendix of Record at 68, Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoff-
man Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
65. See supra note 18 & accompanying text.
66. Such economic pressures, which arise from the nature of the business activity, are
to be distinguished from penal pressures that arise from the threat of legal punishment. See,
e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963). The former may well
lead an individual to seek clarification of statutes the coverage of which is unclear. The
mere existence of a penal pressure such as the fine faced by The Flipside, without notice that
one is or may be subject to the law which imposes it, could hardly be expected to induce
individuals to seek clarification of such laws. Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228
(1957) (city ordinance requiring ex-felons within city limits to register with chief of police
violates due process clause of fourteenth amendment when applied to person who has no
actual knowledge of duty to register).
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quacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is prohibited 67 and
to the adequacy of standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement by law enforcement officials.
68
As one circuit court has noted, "[t]here is concern that it is difficult
to identify drug characteristics that distinguish lawful purposes from
unlawful purposes.169 Consequently, "the courts have generally re-
quired that the statutory definition of drug paraphernalia include a
subjective intent on the part of the. . . seller."' 70 By focusing on intent,
courts can distinguish retailers selling items for non-legal purposes
from innocent retailers who sell the exact same items for legal
purposes.
The Supreme Court noted that the Village's "designed for use"
standard was the subject of considerable confusion on the part of the
Seventh Circuit in Fpside in the face of multiple alternative mean-
ings.7 ' The appellate court thought that some of these interpretations,
especially those not incorporating an intent element, were unconstitu-
tionally vague.
72
The Supreme Court, however, construed the "designed for use"
67. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979); Boyce Motor Lines v.
United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-03 (1945).
68. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); see also Note, supra note 4.
at 453.
69. Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356, 1366 (10th Cir. 1981).
70. Id.
71. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 500.
72. The appellate court found the "design for use" standard objectionable because
items deemed by the guidelines to be "designed for use" with illegal substances had innocent
uses as well:
The license guidelines imply that items "designed" for use with drugs mean those
items which are inherently suited only for drug use, and are thus covered by the
ordinance regardless of the manner of display or avowed intent of the retailer. For
example, the guidelines state that the "roach clips" are "designed for use with ille-
gal cannabis or drugs and therefore covered." But the guidelines do not define
"roach clip." Consequently, stocking any item that could possibly be used as a
roach clip, such as an alligator clip or bobby pin, could subject a retailer to the
licensing requirement. In reality, it is inconceivable that sale of these innocent
items would subject a hardware store or drugstore to the burdens of the license fee
and sales register, as well as to the label of "drug paraphernalia store." Perhaps
the village wishes to draw a line between items which inherently are roach clips
and "innocent" items merely used as roach clips. But neither the ordinance nor the
guidelines draws this distinction, and we are uncertain as to whether any definition
of a roach clip could draw such a distinction based on design alone.
The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 639 F.2d at 380-81 (em-
phasis in original). The appellate court also noted that "designed for use" could signify only
devices that have no use or function other than to aid in the ingestion of illegal cannabis or
drugs; or, it could refer to any device that could be altered from its normal function to
become a makeshift drug device. Id. Because neither the ordinance nor the guidelines clari-




standard to contain an intent element, declaring that the standard re-
ferred to the structural characteristics of an item intended by the manu-
facturer.73 These items were deemed by the ordinance to be drug
paraphernaliaper se, i e., their only purpose was to serve as drug para-
phernalia.74 This standard thus satisfied the two purposes of Grayned:
the retailer was afforded fair warning that specific items were automati-
cally drug paraphernalia; and, arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment by the police was avoided because the ordinance deemed the
items to have no legal use and an officer, upon finding such items for
sale, knew with certainty that a violation had occurred.
Consideration of the "marketed for use" standard's operation
before and after the Court's interposition of a scienter requirement
shows that the addition of an intent element did little to alleviate the
standard's vagueness. As defined by the plain language of the ordi-
nance and guidelines, the "marketed for use" standard originally oper-
ated as a statutory presumption devoid of any intent element.75 The
Court has recognized the right of legislative bodies to devise such statu-
tory presumptions as rules of evidence.7 6 However, in the case of the
Village ordinance, the fact proved (proximity) was itself too vague a
standard to reasonably give rise to the fact presumed (drug parapher-
nalia).77 The guidelines did not define proximity. The term itself car-
ries an inherent vagueness unless further clarified.78 The lack of an
objective reference point created at best a strict liability statute in
which the intent of the retailer becomes irrelevant, and at worst left the
application of the ordinance to the subjectivity of the enforcer, giving
rise to the dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Even with an objective reference point, a proximity standard
73. A finding of manufacturer's intent is not equal to a finding of seller's intent. Were
the Village ordinance a criminal enactment, there would be little question as to the law's
invalidity. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it requires the defendant's specific
intent to violate the law. See Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952).
74. Examples ofper se or "designed for use" articles of drug paraphernalia as defined
by the guidelines to the Village ordinance include paper of colorful design or with names
oriented for use with illegal drugs, roach clips, and literature encouraging illegal drug use.
The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 639 F.2d at 379.
75. See supra note 16 & accompanying text.
76. Mobile, J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42 (1910) (state statute making
proof of injury by railway car prima facie evidence of negligence of railway company up-
held as not violating guarantees of due process or equal protection).
77. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), wherein the Court upheld the use of
statutory presumptions so long as there is a "rational connection" between the "facts
proved" and the "facts presumed." Id. at 33 (citing Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467
(1943)).
78. Pipes displayed next to colored rolling papers are probably covered by the ordi-
nance; pipes displayed at the opposite end of the store are probably not covered. It is argua-
ble whether pipes are covered if displayed three feet away from such paper. See The
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 492 n.3.
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would still have been unreasonable and arbitrary. Items listed in the
guidelines could be marketed within a specifically defined proximity to
each other, erroneously giving rise to a finding that they were drug par-
aphernalia. Such items could have been marketed close to each other
as a "point of purchase" marketing strategy or to prevent shoplifting;
7 9
yet, under a proximity standard, they would have been presumed to be
drug paraphernalia even absent actual intent to market them as such on
the part of the seller.
80
The consequence of upholding the constitutionality of such a
vague standard is that the dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement remain unabated, and the concerns of the Grayned Court are
not met.81 The testimony of the Village legislators and the chief law
enforcer demonstrated the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement arising from the presumption.82 Because a finding of prox-
79. The Flipside asserted that certain items alleged by the Village to be drug parapher-
nalia were placed close to each other by a cash register because such items were often
purchased on impulse by consumers while standing in line. Still other items were placed
together near the register because they were small in size and easily shoplifted. By placing
them together, store clerks could keep an eye on them. Joint Appendix of Record at 43,
Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
These marketing strategies in no way reflect the seller's intent as to the use of these items by
its customers.
80. Owing to the inherently vague nature of the proximity standard, no court prior to
the Flipside case had allowed a proximity standard by itself to be determinative of the fact
that an item was intentionally "marketed for use" as drug paraphernalia. The Eighth Cir-
cuit upheld a drug paraphernalia ordinance as constitutional, in part because a finding of
proximity was but one step in the prosecutorial process. The court stated: "For example,
Section 2(3) provides that authorities shall consider that "[T]he proximity of marijuana...
outside of a store to roach clips inside the store might be considered as one factor in assess-
ing whether the clips were intended as drug paraphernalia by the store owner." Casbah, Inc.
v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551, 560 n.! 1 (8th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original). Once proximity was
found, "the focus of inquiry [had to] necessarily shift to the intent of the individual in-
volved." Id. at 560. The Casbah court permitted a similarly vague proximity standard to
stand insofar as it merely triggered an inquiry into the intent of the individual accused. By
contrast, the Village of Hoffman Estates ordinance does not allow for such a change in the
focus of inquiry, but allows intent to be presumed from a finding of proximity. Other courts
have upheld drug paraphernalia laws in which proximity was but one factor of several listed
as contributing to an inference that an item was marketed as drug paraphernalia. See Hejira
Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356, 1356 (10th Cir. 1981) (one of eleven factors); Record
Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma 638 F.2d 916, 920 (6th Cir. 1980) (one of fourteen
factors). Thus, both jurists and legislators recognized that proximity can at best give rise to
an inference that an item was marketed as drug paraphernalia.
81. See supra note 27 & accompanying text.
82. When asked by counsel "what types of pipes are drug paraphernalia . the
Village President answered, "I rely on those people who know what drug paraphernalia is,
per se." Joint Appendix of Record at 84, Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside. Hoff-
man Estates. Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982). When asked by counsel what items actually fell
under the purview of the ordinance, it was stipulated that the Village Police Chief would
testify that such a determination would be left, in large part, to the judgment of detectives on
his staff. Id. at 34. The record demonstrated an inability to use the proximity standard
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imity was left in the hands of enforcement officials, the presumption in
the Village ordinance that "proximity equals paraphernalia" was
flawed in that it delegated a judicial function to executive officials.8 3
In its attempt to adopt a saving construction of the "marketed for
use" standard, the Supreme Court found that this standard contained
an element of intent, and, additionally, that an item could be "mar-
keted for use" with illegal cannabis or drugs if the seller intentionally
displayed items in a manner that encouraged illegal drug use.84 The
Court construed the standard in this manner despite the language of
the ordinance and guidelines that indicated that "proximity" alone
would support a finding of "marketed for use."85
Unlike the "designed for use" standard, the Court's finding of a
scienter element in the "marketed for use" standard was an inappropri-
ate response. As Professor LaFave notes,86 vague statutes may be of
two types. Uncertain language can result in a statute with limited alter-
native meanings, each of which is sufficiently definite but none of
which is specifically imported into the statute, or the language may be
so uncertain that the range of meanings cannot be discerned at all. The
"designed for use" standard was an example of the former. 87 When
there are such multiple meanings, each of which is certain enough,
there may be sufficient fair warning to justify subsequent construction
and validation of the statute.88 This is what the Supreme Court did
with the "designed for use" standard: from among many meanings, it
construed the standard to be one that contained an intent element.
On the other hand, when the language is so uncertain that no stan-
dard can be ascertained at all, the appropriate remedy is to invalidate
the statute. 89 When no readily apparent construction suggests itself as
a vehicle for rehabilitating the statute, the Court will not endeavor to
construe the statute as constitutional because the constitutional infirmi-
objectively to determine whether a given item was drug paraphernalia. Further, the testi-
mony illustrated that the definition of drug paraphernalia, hinging on a proximity standard,
would be the responsibility of police.
83. Such delegation is violative of the notion of separation of powers. Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974).
84. See supra notes 40-43 & accompanying text.
85. See supra note 16 & accompanying text.
86. W. LA FAVE & A. Scor, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 87 (1972).
87. See supra note 72 & accompanying text.
88. W. LA FAvE & A. ScoTr, JR., supra note 86, at 87.
89. Id. This is true regardless of whether the ordinance is labeled civil or criminal
because the fundamental defect is not the penalty but "the exaction of obedience to a rule or
standard ... so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all." A.B. Small
Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925). See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382
U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (state act that permitted jurors to determine whether an acquitted
defendant shall pay costs held void for vagueness in that it left the public uncertain as to the
conduct it prohibited).
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ties are too great. 90 By finding that the "marketed for use" standard
contained a scienter requirement, the Court held that an item may be
found to be drug paraphernalia if intentionally placed in proximity to
certain other items. However, the criterion of "proximity" itself re-
mains impermissibly vague. 91 The Court in Screws v. United States
92
stated that "[t]he requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful
may not render certain, for all purposes, a statutory definition of the
crime which is in some respects uncertain. ' 93 Under such a construc-
tion the statute still provides no ascertainable standard of liability; a
retailer could be held liable if a trier of fact later concludes only that
the retailer displayed a certain item close to another item. Such a con-
viction would violate the retailer's due process rights to fair warning.
9 4
Because a "marketed for use" standard hinging on proximity, even
with a requirement of intent, provides no ascertainable standard at all,
the Court should have voided the statute.
The Court concurrently adopted a construction of the "marketed
for use" standard that was equivalent to a "totality of all the facts and
circumstances" test. However, by declaring that the surrounding facts
and circumstances gave rise to a finding of "marketed for use," the
Court introduced several new factors.95 By incorporating such new
factors into the standard, the Court went beyond the scope of "readily
apparent constructions" of a standard expressly limited to proximity.
96
90. In United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), the Court de-
clared the cardinal principle that it would not render definite a vague statute when the con-
stitutional infirmities were too great. Id. at 369. Such a situation could arise when the
uncertain language is so vague that no standard is discernible at all. Dombrowski v. Pfister.
380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965).
91. See supra notes 77-78 & accompanying text.
92. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
93. Id. at 102.
94. Id. at 97.
95. See supra text accompanying note 44.
96. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. at 97. The Court's action has a basis in precedent
and indeed is identical to the technique employed to save an otherwise vague statue in the
Screws case. In Screws, a Georgia sheriff beat a black prisoner to death, and was subse-
quently charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 52, which prohibited "willfully" depriving an-
other "of any rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected" to him by the fourteenth
amendment, on account of color or race. id. at 93. The Court determined that the statute
was flawed by the second type of vagueness, i.e., no standard of conduct was discernible at
all because the courts were constantly interpreting the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment; consequently a person could be sent to prison if he did an act which some court
later held violated a person's rights to due process. Moreover, finding an intent requirement
did nothing to render the statute less uncertain, since a person is still deprived of fair warn-
ing even if he intentionally commits an act that some court could later determine violated a
person's due process rights. While the proper remedy ordinarily would have been to void
the statute, the Court reluctantly engaged in the extraordinary action of adopting a meaning
outside the scope of readily apparent constructions by declaring that a requirement of a
specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right "made definite by decision or other rule
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The Court thereby "created" a constitutionally valid ordinance, though
voiding the ordinance may have been a better solution since it was
practical for the legislative body to draft a more precise ordinance.
97
Such a solution would also avoid allegations of improper judicial intru-
sion into the legislative domain, which this decision may well raise.
98
Conclusion
The Fliside Court declared that when an enactment does not
reach constitutionally protected conduct, several factors may permit the
ordinance to be subject to a less strict vagueness analysis. Specifically,
greater vagueness may be permissible when an ordinance contains a
scienter requirement, imposes only civil penalties, or is an economic
regulation.99 In upholding the Village ordinance, the Supreme Court
ignored its own line of cases requiring that civil enactments be re-
viewed for vagueness under the same standards as criminal statutes. In
addition, the traditional reasoning behind allowing greater vagueness
in economic regulations was not applicable to The Flipside's situation.
Finally, the Court may have unjustifiably rehabilitated the ordinance's
"marketed for use" standard in violation of principles previously ar-
of law" saves the Act from any charge of unconstitutionality on the grounds of vagueness.
Id. at 103. As Justice Douglas made clear in the majority opinion, the Court's primary
concern was with preserving a statute that the Court felt to be vital to enforcement of the
fourteenth amendment. Justice Douglas declared that if the statute were to fall for vague-
ness, other decisions under the fourteenth amendment could also be found to have a "simi-
lar lack of specificity." Id. at 100. In Screws, two competing constitutional values were in
fundamental conflict. In that extreme situation, the Court decided that the guarantees of
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment should prevail over the due process con-
siderations behind the vagueness doctrine. In the Flpside case, only one constitutional issue
was involved: The Flipside's right to fair warning of prohibited conduct under due process.
Unlike in Screws, the government interest was not a competing constitutional claim, but an
interest in curtailing the use of drugs. Moreover, in Screws the Supreme Court interpreted a
federal statute. The Court thus had much more freedom to adopt a saving construction. Cf.
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held violative on its
face a municipal ordinance making it a criminal offense for three or more persons to assem-
ble on sidewalks and conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by. Id. at
614. Noting that conduct which annoys some people may not annoy others, the Court found
the ordinance vague, "not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an
imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard
of conduct is specified at all." Id. While the Court could have itself adopted a definition of
"annoy" as it did in adopting a definition of "due process rights" in Screws, the Court in
interpreting a state or municipal statute is limited to giving the statute a reasonable interpre-
tation, one within the scope of readily apparent constructions.
97. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITtrONAL LAW § 12-28, at 719 (1978).
98. An exploration into the murky waters separating judicial and legislative powers is
beyond the scope of the Comment. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; THE FEDERALIST
Nos. 45, 47 (J. Madison).
99. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. at 498-
May/July 1983] VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
ticulated by the Court. The Supreme Court's questionable application
of the various vagueness doctrines will substantially limit a plaintiff's
ability to successfully challenge a statute on vagueness grounds.
Although the Court saved a statute whose worthwhile goal is to
aid the fight against drug abuse, the techniques used by the Court to
achieve this end should not be applied to other enactments. If the
vagueness analysis of Flipside is broadly applied, plaintiffs faced with a
law whose meaning or coverage is unclear may now find a successful
pre-enforcement challenge to the law to be unobtainable. 00
Mark A. Richard*
100. Pre-enforcement challenges also face the requirement that the plaintiff show the
law to be vague in all its applications. See supra note 26 & accompanying text. Plaintiffs are
able to receive broader and more in-depth consideration of their claims in a post-enforce-
ment action since they need not show the law to be vague in all its applications. Id
* Member, Third Year Class.
[Vol. 34THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
